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Abstract 
Collaborative infrastructure projects use hybrid formal and informal governance structures to 
manage transactions. Based on previous desk-top research, the authors identified the key 
mechanisms underlying project governance, and posited the performance implications of the 
governance (Chen et al. 2012). The current paper extends that qualitative research by testing 
the veracity of those findings using data from 320 Australian construction organisations. The 
results provide, for the first time, reliable and valid scales to measure governance and 
performance of collaborative projects, and the relationship between them. The results confirm 
seven of seven hypothesised governance mechanisms; 30 of 43 hypothesised underlying 
actions; eight of eight hypothesised key performance indicators; and the dual importance of 
formal and informal governance. A startling finding of the study was that the implementation 
intensity of informal mechanisms (non-contractual conditions) is a greater predictor of 
project performance variance than that of formal mechanisms (contractual conditions). 
Further, contractual conditions do not directly impact project performance; instead their 
impact is mediated by the non-contractual features of a project. Obligations established under 
the contract are not sufficient to optimise project performance. 
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Introduction  
Over the past decade, collaborative procurement models (CPMs) have been 
increasingly used in many countries for delivering high value, complex infrastructure projects 
in industrial sectors such as road, rail, water, energy, mining and defense (Department of 
Treasury and Finance 2009; Love et al. 2011; Morwood et al. 2008; Scheepbouwer and 
Humphries 2011). A collaborative procurement model is designed to encourage relationships 
between project participants in an effort to maximise outcomes. The rise in the use of 
collaborative procurement reflects the increasing sophistication of construction projects to 
deliver infrastructure and the need to manage high levels of complexity and uncertainty 
(Morwood et al. 2008). Examples of CPMs are project alliances; program alliances; 
integrated project delivery (IPD); early contractor involvement (ECI); and traditional with 
partnering. CPMs have delivered significant community, environmental and social outcomes 
in conjunction with effective cost management and innovation (Davis and Love 2011; Hauck 
et al. 2004; Love et al. 2010). See Kent and Becerik-Gerber (2010); Love et al. (2010); 
Scheepbouwer and Humphries (2011); and Lahdenperä (2012) for a description of these 
delivery systems. The literature suggests that the alliances provide the most robust support of 
collaboration (Ross 2008), albeit with question marks over outcomes and the relatively high 
cost of implementation (Department of Treasury and Finance 2009). 
The current paper focuses on Alliance-type procurement systems, which are currently 
attracting considerable interest across America and Europe after recent extensive use in the 
Australian context (Kelly 2011). The governance of these collaborative projects falls into two 
primary classes – formal and informal. Each project comprises distinct combinations of 
formal and informal mechanisms and underlying actions (Lahdenperä 2012; Love et al. 
2010). Formal governance comprises contractual incentives for clear and equitable risk 
allocation (Lahdenperä 2010; Love et al. 2011). Informal governance comprises non-
3 
 
contractual incentives to enhance mutual trust, enable cooperation, facilitate open 
communication and share knowledge (Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2012). It is evident in the 
literature that different combinations of formal and informal mechanisms are applied within 
various transactional contexts (Love et al. 2010; Scheepbouwer and Humphries 2011). For 
example, high risk projects are likely to involve a greater concentration of informal 
mechanisms, like relationship workshops, to encourage trust.  
Empirical evidence has not yet been established to clearly identify what roles the two 
classes of governance play in performance outcomes (Department of Infrastructure and 
Transport 2011; Kelly 2011; Lenferink et al. 2012; Nyström 2008). This is despite calls from 
prominent industry players (Department of Treasury and Finance 2009). The paper responds 
to this knowledge gap by addressing five research objectives: 
1) To build a conceptual model showing the relationship between governance and 
performance; 
2) To verify the essential mechanisms which define formal and informal governance 
for complex infrastructure delivery; 
3) To verify the essential actions that underlie each mechanism;  
4) To verify key performance indicators for collaborative infrastructure projects; 
5) To investigate the association between project governance classes and project 
performance. 
Previous literature on the topic has presented limited statistically rigorous evidence 
gathered by deductive means about the performance implications of collaborative 
procurement mechanisms (Eriksson and Westerberg 2011). Instead previous contributions 
rely on inductive methods such as interviews (e.g. Bresnen 2009; Davis and Love 2011; 
Hauck et al. 2004; Lenferink et al. 2012; Love et al. 2011; Love et al. 2010; Rose and Manley 
2012). The current study provides much-needed statistical evidence about the performance 
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implications of collaborative governance for infrastructure delivery. This extends the theory 
building cycle into a deductive phase. The findings reported here provide a more 
generalizable understanding of collaborative governance to maximise project outcomes, 
compared to inductive methods. 
 
Building the Conceptual Model 
Project Governance  
Infrastructure projects are usually characterised by a high level of durable transaction-
specific investment and a high degree of uncertainty (Morwood et al. 2008). In line with the 
perspective of transaction-cost economics (Williamson 1979), the construction management 
literature stresses the need to apply collaborative governance to manage the non-
marketability challenges associated with infrastructure project transactions where duration, 
complexity and uncertainty are rapidly increasing (Chan et al. 2010; Lahdenperä 2012; Love 
et al. 2010; Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2012).  
In practice, collaborative infrastructure projects adopt hybrid governance structures 
(Lahdenperä 2012; Lenferink et al. 2012) comprising formal and informal mechanisms, 
which utilise both market and hierarchical transactions (Williamson 1991) to facilitate the 
negotiation and execution of physical and human capital transactions (Chan et al. 2010). 
Formal mechanisms include market transactions through formal contracts and de-
personalized exchange (Ferguson et al. 2005; Williamson 1991), and hierarchical transactions 
through performance measurement and dispute resolution procedures (Gulati and Singh 
1998). Formal governance mechanisms are largely independent of the specific people 
involved, can specify outcomes (Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009), and are suitable for 
controlling physical capital, which is easily codified (written down) and transmitted (Hoetker 
and Mellewigt 2009).  
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By comparison, informal mechanisms focus on relationships (Hoetker and Mellewigt 
2009; Macneil 2000), and include people and social-based hierarchical relations for 
enhancing mutual trust, open communication, cooperation and knowledge sharing (Gulati and 
Singh 1998). Informal mechanisms are normally applied as non-contractual stimuli designed 
to enable equitable allocation of risk through influencing the attitudes of individuals involved 
in the transaction, and are tightly bound to the specific individuals and their relationships 
(Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009). Hence the outcomes of informal mechanisms largely depend 
upon interactions between individual participants and cannot be pre-specified (Hoetker and 
Mellewigt 2009). These mechanisms are most suitable for controlling human capital 
transactions, which are idiosyncratic due to the tacit nature of the knowledge and the 
cognitive context involved (Williamson 1979).  
 
Formal Mechanisms   
A previous review of leading construction management literature by the authors 
(Chen et al. 2012) identified three essential mechanisms of formal governance: ‘collective 
cost estimation’, ‘risk and reward sharing regime’, and ‘design integration’. These 
mechanisms are described below prior to verifying that they are a valid measure of formal 
governance. 
 
Collective Cost Estimation 
The cost of alliance projects are jointly estimated by an integrated team formed by the 
owner, designer, contractor and other service providers during the Target Cost Estimate 
(TCE) process (Love et al. 2011). The parties come together to develop the scope of work, 
define the time schedule, and agree on cost-reimbursable principles (Morwood et al. 2008). 
As an essential output of the TCE process, the target outturn cost (TOC) is developed to 
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represent the expected cost of the project’s scope at completion, including project specific 
costs and overheads, as well as service providers’ profit margin and non-project related 
corporate overheads (Morwood et al. 2008). The TOC is used as the benchmark to assess 
performance and to determine how risk and rewards are shared by the parties (Department of 
Infrastructure and Transport 2011; Love et al. 2011). An actual outturn cost (AOC) close to 
the TOC also demonstrates value for money (Love et al. 2011).  
ECI combines principles of Alliances and traditional Design and Build (DB) methods, 
and uses a two stage arrangement to manage initial risks. The collective cost estimation is 
primarily carried out in the collaborative stage, where the owner, contractor and designer 
work together to develop the design, program, budget and risk allocation model (Lenferink et 
al. 2012; Scheepbouwer and Humphries 2011). Alliance and ECI project structures are 
tailored to the unique characteristics of a given project, where owners ensure price 
competitiveness through selecting either one or multiple service provider teams to participate 
in the scoping and pricing stage (Lahdenperä 2010; Lenferink et al. 2012; Love et al. 2011; 
Scheepbouwer and Humphries 2011).  
Engaging only one service provider team in the pricing stage has been found to enable 
better development of a trustful and cooperative relationship between the owner and the 
proponent (Kelly 2011; Ross 2008). However, this approach is also criticized for lacking 
sufficient incentive to achieve cost-effective pricing, which has been argued as the advantage 
of the multiple team approach, since the later builds competitive tension between the 
proponent teams (Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011). The choice of approach 
depends largely on the transactional context of the specific project (Lenferink et al. 2012; 
Morwood et al. 2008). 
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Risk and Reward Sharing Regime 
The risk and reward sharing regime constitutes the foundation of collaborative 
procurement’s commercial framework (Chan et al. 2010; Lahdenperä 2012; Lenferink et al. 
2012). In alliance projects, this regime enables the parties (including the owner) to share 
savings and overruns according to the set TOC. That is, any cost under- or over-run against 
this TOC is split in pre-agreed, specified proportions (Lahdenperä 2010; Love et al. 2011). 
Normally, the owner takes 50% of both the gain (profit due to cost underruns) and pain (loss 
due to cost overruns), and the remaining 50% is available to be split between the service 
providers (Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011; Morwood et al. 2008).  
Historically, most Alliance contracts cap the overall risk for each service provider at 
the loss of the service provision fee, which means that even in the worst case scenario, the 
service providers will still be reimbursed for the direct costs of the project  (Morwood et al. 
2008). The owner’s non-price objectives are represented by Key Result Areas (KRAs) such 
as facility performance, safety, and timely completion, which are pre-agreed between the 
owner and service providers, and measured and rewarded based on Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) (Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011; Morwood et al. 2008).  
In the case of ECI projects, the payment to the contractor is based on actual cost at an 
agreed rate, plus an agreed amount for profit and overheads (Scheepbouwer and Humphries 
2011). Similarly to project alliances, the contractor is financially rewarded for success in 
some KRAs from a performance pool (Edwards 2009).  
 
Design Integration  
Formal mechanisms are designed specifically to spur the parties to invest and 
cooperate in joint design during the development phase, which is critical for innovation and 
project success (Lenferink et al. 2012; Love et al. 2010; Morwood et al. 2008). Through 
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collaborative pricing and scoping, risk analysis and investigation, and transparent costs and 
documentation, service providers are able to prepare a price based on a reasonable 
understanding of the project (Love et al. 2011; Scheepbouwer and Humphries 2011). This is 
essential for maximizing outcomes, since the owner benefits from a range of design 
scenarios, sensible risk management and appropriate contract development. Additionally, a 
secured margin increases financial certainty for contractors, thereby reducing the likelihood 
of margin recovery strategies such as claims (Lenferink et al. 2012; Morwood et al. 2008; 
Scheepbouwer and Humphries 2011). 
The above discussion leads to two hypotheses specifically relating to formal 
governance: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The implementation intensity of formal mechanisms is positively 
associated with project performance. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Formal mechanisms are attributes of the governance structures of 
collaborative projects.  
 
Informal Mechanisms  
A previous review of leading construction management literature by the authors 
(Chen et al. 2012) identified four essential mechanisms of informal governance: ‘leadership’, 
‘relationship manager’, ‘team workshops’ and ‘joint communication’. These mechanisms are 
described below prior to verifying that they are a valid measure of formal governance. 
 
Leadership  
A collaborative project adopts a special leadership structure to integrate project 
participants. The leadership structure of alliance projects is a typical example, where a 
Project Board is established to provide vision, governance and leadership. Further, a Project 
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Management Team drives operational project delivery. The Board and Team are formed by 
representatives from the owner organization and the service providers (Department of 
Infrastructure and Transport 2011; Morwood et al. 2008). In ECI projects, a significant level 
of design management needs to be passed to the design team jointly formed by the designer 
and contractor (Scheepbouwer and Humphries 2011). This arrangement requires the owner to 
appoint a design leader, who has the ability to communicate with the integrated design team, 
to ensure that the design is firmly aligned with the owner’ objectives (Scheepbouwer and 
Humphries 2011).  
Normally, project leaders are selected based on project specific experience and 
logistical skills (Morwood et al. 2008; Scheepbouwer and Humphries 2011). However, in 
collaborative projects other skills become important, such as leadership and communication 
capabilities; cultural alignment skills; and capacity to influence resources available to the 
project (Walker and Lloyd-Walker 2011). 
 
Team Integration 
Collaborative projects demand integration of the resources and capabilities of service 
providers from broad areas including design, construction, systems and controls, community 
stakeholders and environmental groups (Chan et al. 2010; Lahdenperä 2012). The 
management of relationships and culture are usually well planned at the beginning of the 
project (Love et al. 2010; Scheepbouwer and Humphries 2011). The team forming process 
considers not only complementary resources and capabilities of potential partners, but also 
the inter-relationships between partners and the client (Davis and Love 2011; Morwood et al. 
2008). The client organizations often introduce a ‘relationship manager’ to the project team to 
align expectations and maintain relationships amongst all team members (Love et al. 2010). 
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Team Workshops 
Relationship workshops are widely used in collaborative projects to facilitate open 
communication, build relationships and achieve mutual understanding (Chan et al. 2010). 
Independent facilitators are commonly engaged for team development activities and cultural 
alignment in workshops (Lahdenperä 2012; Morwood et al. 2008). In the early stages of 
Alliance and ECI projects, selection workshops and commercial alignment workshops are 
used to identify technical issues and build relationships between parties (Chan et al. 2010; 
Lenferink et al. 2012). Through these workshops, the owner and service providers 
collectively generate the vision for project delivery, develop the principles for the 
commercial arrangement, and design an innovation program (Davis and Love 2011; Edwards 
2009). In Alliance projects, which tend to be of longer duration than ECI projects, workshops 
are extended into the project operation phase to promote effective coordination and 
innovation, as well as in the project evaluation phase to enable learning and reinforce 
relationships for future projects (Davis and Walker 2009; Morwood et al. 2008). 
 
Communication Systems   
Collaborative project governance emphasizes the principle of co-operative joint 
decision making, and demands an effective use of information system to support open 
communication, information sharing and organizational alignment (Hauck et al. 2004; Love 
et al. 2010). An integrated web-based IT system incorporating building information 
modelling (BIM) is increasingly needed to facilitate information flow (Kent and Becerik-
Gerber 2010). Specific communication tools, such as an expectation matrix, are also 
developed for the team members to share and match their views, and align their commitments 
to each other (Love et al. 2010). The establishment and training needs for the IT system need 
to be addressed at project commencement (Morwood et al. 2008).  
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The above discussion leads to two hypotheses specifically relating to informal 
governance: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The implementation intensity of informal mechanisms is 
positively associated with project performance.  
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Informal mechanisms are attributes of the governance structures 
of collaborative projects. 
 
Project Performance 
The ultimate purpose in designing governance structures is to achieve project 
performance targets, which align with the owner’s objectives (Department of Treasury and 
Finance 2009; Lenferink et al. 2012). The primary challenge associated with the execution of 
a collaborative project lies in creating an appropriate combination of formal and informal 
mechanisms (Bresnen 2009; Lahdenperä 2012). The heterogeneity of project performance is 
attributable to the differing implementation and composition of governance structures  
(Department of Treasury and Finance 2009; Eriksson and Westerberg 2011). Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is put forward: 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): The implementation intensity of collaborative project governance 
structures, as defined by the combination of both formal and informal mechanisms, is 
positively associated with project performance. 
The degree to which informal mechanisms are implemented is constrained by the 
formal mechanisms that are in place. Collective cost estimation and the risk and reward 
sharing regime have been shown to particularly affect the collaborative behavior of 
participants involved in collaborative projects (Lenferink et al. 2012; Morwood et al. 2008; 
Ross 2008). Alliance projects embrace risk by adopting a cooperative strategy in both project 
development and construction phases, use fully integrated project teams and communication 
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systems, and carry out intensive workshops (Hauck et al. 2004; Love et al. 2010). In non-
alliance environments, collaborative procurement in the form of conventional contracts with 
partnership agreements, or ECI, has a stronger emphasis on cost, with less use of collective 
cost estimation and risk sharing (Chan et al. 2010; Scheepbouwer and Humphries 2011). 
Further details concerning procurement model development are reported in Chen et al (2012). 
Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): The implementation intensity of formal mechanisms is positively 
associated with that of informal mechanisms. 
Based on these hypotheses, the conceptual model shown in Fig. 1 was developed. The 
model shows that there are two main types of project governance – formal and informal, and 
seven mechanisms sitting under them. There are three formal mechanisms and four informal 
mechanisms. The model shows the four hypotheses (H1-4) specifically relating to the 
identified positive influence of formal and informal governance mechanisms on project 
performance. Hypothesis H5 is that variation in project performance is dependent on the 
implementation and composition of governance structures, both formal and informal. Finally, 
hypothesis H6 is that formal and informal governance are complementary. 
[Insert Fig. 1] 
 
Methods 
Operationalization of the constructs 
This section describes how the key constructs were operationally defined. The 
operational definitions were used to construct the survey questions. 
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Project governance 
Based on the seven governance mechanisms previously identified by the authors 
(Chen et al. 2012), the current research involved identifying the action items that underpin 
each mechanism. The Project Governance construct was operationalized through directed 
content analysis (Krippendorff 2004), where well established theories and findings of prior 
research were used to identify key variables as initial coding categories. The analysis 
involved three steps. The  first step drew on transaction-cost economics theory (Williamson 
1979, 1991), relational contract theory (Feinman 2000; Macneil 2000), and strategic alliances 
literature (e.g. Gulati and Singh 1998; Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009) to derive the initial 
dimensions for the operationalization.  
The second step considered papers published between 2000 to 2013 by construction 
management journals reporting studies related to alliances, cooperative procurement, 
relational contract and partnering. During this period collaborative procurement is considered 
to have been most active. The analysis canvassed papers published in sources including but 
not limited to: Journal of Construction Engineering and Management; Journal of 
Management in Engineering; Construction Management and Economics; Engineering, 
Construction and Architectural Management; International Journal of Project Management. 
The third step analyzed government publications and industry reports published over the 
same time period in Australia, Europe and the US, as the three primary locations using 
collaborative contracts.  
Nvivo 10, a qualitative data analysis software (Bazeley 2007; QSR International 
2013), was used to support the systematic coding process. The software helped the authors to 
classify, arrange and sort information found in the literature. It combined analysis through 
searching, shaping, linking, and cross-examination functions (QSR International 2013). The 
coding process was checked independently by the two authors and then cross-referenced 
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between them. Care was taken to identify the action items that were mutually exclusive, 
limited in number, and clearly aligned with a specific governance mechanism. Coding 
continued until the number of new action items found substantially diminished with further 
reading or cross referencing. The validity and reliability of findings was supported by the 
traingulation process. Further integrity was provided by refining the codes following 
feedback from an expert panel that comprised three senior construction industry executives, 
drawn from the industry association supporting the research process. The coding process 
identified a total of 43 action items under the seven mechanisms to operationally define the 
construct of Project Governance. Of the 43 items, 23 are formal governance items and 20 are 
informal governance items.  
 
Project performance 
The operational definition of Project Performance construct was developed based the 
measures used by a recent empirical study within the collaborative contracting context in 
Australia (Department of Treasury and Finance 2009). The measures were assessed against 
the discussions about both cost and non-cost associated performance evaluation of 
collaborative projects in the construction management literature (Chan et al. 2010; Morwood 
et al. 2008). The measures were also compared with the criteria recently proposed by 
Eriksson and Westerberg (2011) for measuring the success of collaborative projects. This 
assessment identified eight performance indicators to operationalize the Project Performance 
construct. The eight indicators cover major themes of performance evaluation for 
collaborative projects without duplication or omission.  
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Survey Design and Data Collection 
The unit of analysis was a collaborative infrastructure project. The survey was 
distributed in 2013 by email to 1,688 participants on such projects. The survey was structured 
to capture 1) respondent and project characteristics; 2) respondents’ project performance; and 
3) the implementation intensity of governance mechanisms within respondents’ projects. The 
contact database of the Alliancing Association of Australasia (AAA) was used to build the 
sampling frame. The database contains most of the senior construction sector practitioners 
with collaborative project experience in Australia, comprising public and private sector 
clients, contractors, consultants and suppliers.  
The operational definitions of the two primary constructs, Project Governance and 
Project Performance were used to design the survey. A total of 43 action items covering 
formal mechanisms (FM) and informal mechanisms (IM) were constructed. The survey 
required respondents to rate the degree to which each of these items was implemented in their 
most recently completed collaborative project, on a 7 point Likert scale (1 = strongly 
disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Similarly, eight items operationalizing Project Performance 
were constructed, being ‘time efficiency’, ‘cost efficiency’, ‘quality of work’, ‘team 
collaboration’, ‘innovation’, ‘safety’, ‘environmental impact’, and ‘community impact’. The 
eight items were assessed as performance targets by respondents on a 7 point Likert scale (1 
= substantially below target; 7 = substantially above target).  
Following the advice of Neuman (2003), a pilot study was carried out to evaluate the 
clarity and relevance of the survey to the target respondents, in order to ensure the face 
validity of the measurement items. Practitioners from the industry were invited to pilot test 
the survey at an industry conference in 2012. Written feedback was received from 8 
practitioners, informal verbal feedback from 12 practitioners, and detailed interviews were 
subsequently conducted with 2 expert practitioners in collaborative procurement. The 
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feedback was used to increase the clarity of the final survey and to improve the functionality 
of the electronic survey instrument. At this point, description of measurement items and 
scales was finalised.  
 
Sample Size and Response Rate  
Bartlett et al. (2001) suggests that a suitably rigorous sample size and corresponding 
response rate is that which achieves an alpha level of 0.05 with a 3% margin of error, when 
determined using Bartlett’s sample size estimation formula. Bartlett’s formula was applied to 
the early responses received by January 2013 to estimate the response rate that would ensure 
an appropriate error level. For the sampling frame of 1,688 prospective respondents, the 
target was estimated to be approximately an 18.5% response rate, an equivalent sample size 
of 312 responses. 
At closure of the survey, 357 responses had been received. Of these, 37 responses 
were eliminated due to either a) containing a large proportion of missing values pertaining to 
project performance items, or b) pertaining to a project excluded from the geographic scope 
of the survey (i.e. outside Australia). The remaining 320 responses were considered suitable 
for inclusion in that they had less than 5% missing values (as stipulated by Tabachinick and 
Fidell (2001)) with a non-significant Little’s MCAR test indicating the missing values were 
not dependent on other data values (i.e. missing at random) (Little and Rubin 2002). The 320 
valid responses constituted an overall response rate of 19.0%, meeting the estimated target 
response rate. 
 
Participant and Project Characteristics 
The survey posed a series of questions to characterize the nature of the respondents 
and the nature of their most recently completed project to which their subsequent survey 
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responses pertained. The responses to these items are presented in Table 1. Table 1 shows 
that 86% of nominated projects were completed between 2009 and 2013, and 79% were 
delivered by using alliance contracts. The majority of the projects were delivered for public 
sector clients (86%) and clients that were experienced in asset procurement (89%). This is 
consistent with expectations reported in the literature (Department of Treasury and Finance 
2009; Morwood et al. 2008; Scheepbouwer and Humphries 2011). Table 1 shows that 89% of 
the respondents had been involved in the delivery of at least 1 collaborative project prior to 
the project they reported on in the survey, with 17% having worked on 10 or more 
collaborative projects. Responses were approximately equally distributed between 
representatives of client, contractor and consultant organizations (34%, 34% and 31%, 
respectively) while sub-contractor and supplier organizations were infrequently represented. 
Overall, the data in Table 1 indicates that the responses gathered represent a broad cross 
section of participant organizations and collaborative project types, across a range of sectors, 
locations, and project values.  
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Data Analysis Strategy 
Data analysis comprised two stages. In the first stage, both exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analyses (EFA and CFA) were undertaken to develop reliable and valid 
measurement scales for the two primary constructs: Project Governance (PG) and Project 
Performance (PP). The EFA identified the underlying factors of the two constructs, while the 
CFA confirmed the factorial structures of both constructs. The CFA models of the PG 
construct addressed hypotheses H2 and H4, and provided statistical evidence to test if formal 
and informal mechanisms are attributes of Project Governance. Both first- and second- order 
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CFA models were tested to assess if the underlying formal and informal governance 
mechanisms derived from the literature were an appropriate fit to the survey data. 
In the second stage of data analysis, the measurement scales of the two validated 
constructs were used to test the relationships proposed by hypotheses H1, H3, H5 and H6. 
Correlation and regression analyses were used to test the hypothesised relationships between 
Formal Mechanisms (FM) and PP (H1); Informal Mechanisms (IM) and PP (H3); PG and PP 
(H5), and the relationship between the FM and IM constructs (H6). The literature suggested 
that project value in particular may affect the degree of mechanism implementation  and 
subsequent project performance (Kelly 2011; Morwood et al. 2008). ‘Project value’ was thus 
included as a control variable in these regression models to assess its impact on the above 
relationships. The measurement scale of ‘project value’ is presented in Appendix B. Finally, 
path analysis was used to confirm the relationships identified by the exploratory approaches. 
This process resulted in the determination of a refined model that improves upon the 
conceptual model by identifying alternate relationship pathways between the constructs that 
are strongly supported by the data.  
IBM SPSS 20.0 was used to perform the exploratory analysis (i.e. EFA, correlation 
and regression analysis). Version 21 of AMOS (Analysis of Moment Structure), a structural 
equation modeling (SEM) software, was used to perform the confirmatory analysis (i.e. CFA 
and path analysis). 
 
Results  
Confirmation of measurement items and factors 
EFA was used to validate and clarify the components of the PG and PP constructs 
derived from the literature. The EFAs of the PG and PP constructs reported a significant 
Bartlett test of sphericity. The assessment of Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 
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adequacy (> 0.6) and the inspection of the anti-image correlation matrix established the 
factorability of the correlation matrices. Following the advice of Hair et al. (1998: 110), 
principal component analysis and Varimax rotation were adopted in the EFAs to derive a 
clear separation of the factors. The cumulative percentage of total variance extracted by the 
factors in the EFAs were much higher than the proposed threshold of 60% (Hair et al. 1998: 
104). The individual items within each construct were considered ‘essential’ where the 
analysis assigned a factor loading of 0.50 or above, indicative of statistical significance at the 
0.05 level, with a power of 80% within the sample of 320 cases (Hair et al. 1998: 112). 
 
Project Governance (PG) 
The conceptual model (Fig. 1) proposed that collaborative projects are managed by 
formal and informal mechanisms, comprising seven types, designed to improve project 
performance. All of the 43 mechanism items were input into the EFA to identify the 
underlying factors in the data structure. As presented in Appendix A, the EFA validated eight 
factors, rather than the seven mechanisms in Fig.1: ‘risk and reward sharing regime (7 
items)’, ‘collective cost estimation (2 items)’, ‘risk sharing of service providers (2 items)’, 
‘leadership (6 items)’, ‘team workshops (6 items)’, ‘relationship manager (2 items)’, ‘joint 
communication systems (2 items )’, and ‘design integration (3 items)’. Thirteen items were 
removed due to low factor loadings (< 0.50) and cross-loadings. For example, the ‘team 
integration’ mechanism of the conceptual model was operationally defined with 5 items. 
During the EFA, one item was assigned to ‘leadership’ factor; two items were deleted due to 
low factor loadings (< 0.50). The factor was renamed as ‘relationship manager’ since the 2 
items left in the factor specifically focus on the functions of relationship manager. In the end, 
the eight factors comprised the 30 items shown in Appendix A. In the PG scale, they 
accounted for 68.5% of total variance, and are of good internal reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = 
20 
 
0.87). The EFA results of the PG construct also verified the existence of formal and informal 
governance as shown in Fig. 1. 
 
Project Performance (PP)  
As presented in Appendix A, the EFA identified three factors among the 8 PP items: 
‘sustainable operation’ (3 items), ‘innovation and collaboration’ (3 items), and ‘cost and time 
efficiency’ (2 items). No variable was deleted due to low factor loadings (< 0.50) or cross-
loadings. These three factors account for 76.9% of total variance among the included items, 
with the scale showing overall good internal reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.86).  
 
Confirmation of construct structure 
CFAs were conducted to confirm the factorial structure and validity of the PG and PP 
constructs, by verifying the nature and strength of the relationships between each construct 
and their proposed underlying factors. Both first-order and second-order CFA models were 
tested for the two constructs. Even though in the analysis, the review of the kurtosis values 
revealed no variable to be substantially kurtotic (i.e. kurtosis value > 7) (Byrne 2010: 103), 
the assessments on the values of normalized estimate of multivariate kurtosis revealed that 
the data were slightly multivariate non-normal in the CFAs. Following the advice of Byrne 
(2010), the bootstrap procedure was performed across 1,000 bootstrap samples to assess the 
stability of the parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit indices thereby reporting their values 
with a greater degree of accuracy. 
 
Factorial Structure of Project Governance 
The sample size of 320 cases failed to meet the minimum sample size in terms of the 
ratio of cases to free parameters (10:1) (Kline 2005: 178) for testing total disaggregation CFA 
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models of the PG construct. In view of this fact, the partially aggregated CFA models were 
tested to confirm the factor level structure. The principal advantage of the partial aggregation 
model lies in its capacity to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated and to decrease 
measurement error, particularly when the sample size is relatively small (Bagozzi and 
Edwards 1998).  
The initial first-order CFA model (Model s1) hypothesised a priori that responses to 
the PG construct could be explained by two first-order factors; FM and IM, respectively, as 
presented in Fig. 2. These two factors in turn were then proposed to be explained by the 
aggregated manifest variables derived by the EFAs, with the mechanisms’ operationally 
defined based on the conceptual model (Fig. 1). Fig. 2 shows, the factor of FM was explained 
by the four aggregated manifest variables, of ‘risk and reward sharing regime’, ‘risk sharing 
of service providers’, ‘collective cost estimation’, and ‘design integration.’ The factor of IM 
was explained by four aggregated manifest variables of ‘leadership’, ‘team workshops’, 
‘relationship manager’ and ‘communication system’. The fit indices of Model s1 are 
presented in Table 2. 
[insert Table 2 and Fig. 2] 
Based on the indication of the modification indices, ‘design integration’ was re-
specified as an underlying variable of both FM and IM factors for testing. As presented in 
Fig. 2, the final first-order CFA model (Model s2) was generated after the removal of the 
insignificant link (at p < 0.05 level) between ‘design integration’ and FM. Subsequent to the 
model re-specification, Model s2 presented much better fit indices in comparison with the 
initial model (Model s1) as presented in Table 2. This finding suggests that according to the 
opinions of the respondents, ‘design integration’ is an underlying factor of IM rather than 
FM. The correlation value between the FM and IM factors in Model s2 is 0.46, which is 
much lower than the high limit of 0.85. This is evidence for discriminant validity in that the 
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two distinct governance constructs are not highly correlated (Kline 2005: 73). The analysis 
also presented a sound feasibility of the parameter estimates, which were statistically 
different from zero at the level of 0.05. The standardized estimates and correlation values of 
Model s2 are presented in Fig. 2. 
Based on the factorial structure of Model s2, the second-order CFA model of the PG 
construct (Model s3) was tested to further demonstrate the factorial validity of the construct. 
As presented in Table 2, the fit indices of Model s3 have the same values as those of Model 
s2, again indicating a good fit to the data. The 99% bias-corrected confidence intervals for 
both the unstandardized and standardized regression weights indicate that the regression 
weights are significant at the p < 0.01 level. Shown in Appendix A, the standardized estimate 
of factor loadings based on the original sample are significant at p < 0.01 level. 
The CFAs confirmed the factorial structures of the PG construct, thereby upholding 
Hypotheses 2 and 4. The analysis supported that within the empirical context of collaborative 
infrastructure projects in Australia, formal and informal mechanisms are two attributes of 
project governance. The valid and reliable measurement scale was used to measure the PG 
construct, as well as the FM and IM factors in the subsequent analysis for relationship 
identification.  
 
Factorial Structure of Project Performance 
Total disaggregation CFA models of the PP construct were tested to confirm the 
factorial validity. The construct was first tested by a first-order CFA model (Model s4). The 
relationships between the performance measurement items and the underlying factors 
identified by the EFA were postulated a priori and then tested by the CFA. The analysis 
indicated that parameter estimates were of sound feasibility. Modification indices reveal no 
factor-cross loading or error covariance. The correlation values between the three factors in 
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Model s4 ranged from 0.47 to 0.76, which are lower than the high limit of 0.85, and 
indicative of satisfactory discriminant validity (Kline 2005: 73).  
Building on the findings of Model s4, a second-order CFA model (Model s5) was 
tested to further confirm the factorial validity of the PP measurement scale. In the analysis, 
99% bias-corrected confidence intervals for both the unstandardized and standardized 
regression weights indicate that the regression weights are significant at p < 0.01 level. The 
significant (p < 0.01) standardized estimates of factor loadings derived based on the original 
sample are presented in Appendix A. The fit indices of Models s4 and s5 present the same 
values, which indicate both models fit the data well. In view of the findings, the measurement 
scales represented by the second-order CFA model are considered of good validity and 
reliability to measure the project performance of the research population.  
The CFA results confirmed that ‘cost and time efficiency’, ‘innovation and 
collaboration’, and ‘sustainable operation’ are three major aspects of project performance 
evaluation according to experienced practitioners within the context of collaborative 
infrastructure projects in Australia. The underlying items of this reliable and valid 
measurement scale were used to measure PP construct within this empirical context.  
 
Relationship identification within and between constructs 
Relationship Exploration  
Correlation and regression analyses were employed to explore the relationships 
between the PG and PP constructs, as well as those between the FM and IM factors and the 
PP construct. As presented in Table 3, the correlation analysis results indicate significant 
positive associations (p < 0.01) between PG, FM, IM and PP, thereby providing initial 
support to Hypotheses 1, 3, 5 and 6. The control variable of ‘project value’ is significantly 
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associated with PG, FM and IM, whilst its association with PP is insignificant at p < 0.05 
level. The significant correlations provide the basis for undertaking the regression analysis. 
[insert Table 3] 
The independent variables of the models presented in Table 4 were entered in their 
respective regression models for testing at the same step. As shown in the left hand side of 
the table, the Models r1, r2 and r3 are significant at the p < 0.01 level, respectively explaining 
5.5%, 12.1% and 12.7% of the variance in the PP construct. The results respectively support 
Hypotheses 1, 3, and 5 in that the measures of the intensity of the implementation of FM, IM 
and the combined PG were all positively and significantly related to PP. A comparison of the 
results of Models r1 and r2 also indicated that compared to IM, FM had relatively lesser 
explanatory power in terms of the proportion of variance accounted for in PP. The 
comparison between Models r2 and r4 further indicates that FM only explains 0.8% (p < 
0.05) of the variance of PP in addition to what is already explained by the IM construct. 
‘Project value’ does not provide an additionally significant explanation (at p < 0.05) of PP 
variance in Models r1-4.  
[insert Table 4] 
As presented in the right hand side of Table 4, the regression Model r5 demonstrates 
that ‘project value’ (p < 0.05) and FM (p < 0.01) significantly explains 19.4% of the variance 
in IM. The results are indicative of the potential mediating effect of IM on the relationship 
between FM and PP.  The findings of the correlation and regression analyses support that 
both formal and informal mechanisms, as well as overall project governance, can be used to 
explain and predict the variance of project performance. Higher implementation intensity of 
the governance mechanisms is associated with higher project performance, a finding in 
support of Hypothesis 5. The implementation intensity of informal mechanisms explains and 
predicts more variance of project performance, than that of formal mechanisms. The findings 
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also imply that formal and informal mechanisms represented by the PG measurement scale 
play essential positive roles in achieving project performance targets. 
 
Relationship Confirmation 
Path models were analyzed to test the potential mediating effect of IM on the 
relationship between FM and PP. The initial path model was specified with links supported 
by the results of the regression analysis. The estimation of the initial model identified that the 
path from FM to PP was not statistically significant (p = 0.11). Hence Model s6 was re-
specified without this insignificant link. The standardized regression weights of the re-
specified model based on the original sample are presented in Fig. 3. The 95% bias-corrected 
confidence intervals computed across 1,000 bootstrap samples indicate that both the 
unstandardized and standardized regression weights in the fitted models are significant at p < 
0.05.  
By including the significant, however relatively weak (β = 0.11, p = 0.03) impact of 
‘project value’ on IM, Model s6 is indicative of a mediocre fit to the data, as presented in 
Table 2. After removing the impact of ‘project value’, Model s7 (see Fig. 4) shows a very 
good overall fit. Hence following the procedures suggested by Kenny et al. (1998), the path 
analysis confirmed that the influence of FM on the PP construct indicated by regression 
Models r1and r4 (see Table 4) is completely mediated by IM. A Sobel test (p < 0.01) 
confirmed that IM significantly carries the influence of FM to PP (Sobel 1982; Soper 2013). 
While Hypothesis 6 was thus supported by the previously established positive association 
between FM and IM, the relationship of these two factors to PP is more complex. The 
findings of the path analysis suggest that, within the empirical context, the influence of 
formal mechanisms on project performance seems indirect, and need to be enabled by 
conducive informal mechanisms.  
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[insert Figs. 3 and 4] 
 
Discussion  
The analysis validated that both formal and informal mechanisms were perceived by 
the practitioners to be attributes of collaborative project governance used to manage complex 
infrastructure projects in Australia. The research has also confirmed the essential mechanisms 
which define formal and informal governance for collaborative infrastructure projects. Three 
market mechanisms define formal governance (1) collective cost estimation, (2) risk and 
reward sharing regime, and (3) risk sharing of service providers; while five social-based 
hierarchical mechanisms define informal governance (1) leadership, (2) relationship manager, 
(3) team workshops, (4) joint communication systems, and (5) design integration. 
Design integration is normally specified as a formal mechanism in collaborative 
contractual arrangements. However, given the strength of social-based hierarchical 
mechanisms, the extent to which ‘design integration’ is implemented is dependent upon 
human capital investment. The outcomes of ‘design integration’ implementation are also 
largely dependent upon interactions between individual participants, hence are difficult to 
pre-specify. This appears to be the reason why the respondents perceived ‘design integration’ 
to be an informal mechanism in the current study. The validated model therefore shows that 
formal mechanisms are now comprised entirely of market mechanisms. 
The analysis also validated that ‘cost and time efficiency’, ‘innovation and 
collaboration’, and ‘sustainable operations’ are three major aspects of performance evaluation 
on collaborative infrastructure projects in Australia and New Zealand. The regression 
analysis confirmed that the implementation intensity of formal and informal mechanisms as 
well as that of project governance has a significant positive influence on project performance.  
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The statistically significant associations of the PG construct, and its underlying FM 
and IM factors, with the PP construct, are consistent with the relationships proposed by the 
conceptual model. The findings derived by correlation and regression analysis provide 
empirical evidence to support the nomological validity of the measurement scale of the PG 
construct and its factors. In other words, the PG measurement scale demonstrates the 
relationships asserted in theory. The qauntitative evidence from the infrastructure project 
delivery context supports arguments about the need of both market and social-based 
hierarchical mechanisms for collaborative project delivery in the construction management 
literature. The findings are also in line with the assertions about the governance of complex 
human and physical capital transactions in the theories of transaction-cost economics and 
relational contracting.  
While both formal and informal mechanisms have positive impacts on performance, 
the implementation intensity of informal mechanisms is a greater predictor of project 
performance variance, than that of formal mechanisms. The strength of this finding was 
unexpected, and certainly supports more extensive use of collaborative delivery systems. 
Furthermore, the influence of formal mechanisms on project performance was found to be 
mediated by informal mechanisms. Consistent with recent work examining project 
governance, the study found that hybrid project governance, which combines both formal and 
informal mechanisms with both market and hierarchical transactions, is needed to achieve 
project performance targets. The study advances the frontier of knowledge by identifying and 
explaining the different roles played by the two types of mechanisms. The findings imply that 
formal and informal governance are not interchangeable; each has a distinctive role.  Thus 
they rely on each other to maximise project performance.  
Using market transactions, formal mechanisms provide a framework for governing 
depersonalized exchange. This framework facilitates and frames the implementation of 
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informal mechanisms. Conversely, formal mechanisms may only achieve clear and equitable 
risk allocation, when enabled by the collaborative cognitive context created by social-based 
hierarchy governance. In other words, the degree to which collaborative contractual 
incentives affect project performance largely depends on the intensity of informal 
mechanisms. This finding explains the performance heterogeneity of very similar projects, 
such as highway projects delivered by the same CPM. The difference lies in the social 
context created by informal mechanisms. This underscores the importance of strong 
leadership as well as effective relationship management and team integration in achieving 
clients’ objectives. 
 
Conclusion   
This paper has successfully: 
• built a conceptual model showing the relationship between governance and 
performance; 
• verified the essential mechanisms which define formal and informal governance 
for complex infrastructure delivery; 
• verified the essential actions that underlie each mechanism;  
• verified key performance indicators for collaborative infrastructure projects; 
• demonstrated the association between project governance and project 
performance. 
 
The study found that informal mechanisms (non-contractual conditions) were a 
greater predictor of project performance than formal mechanisms (contractual conditions). 
Further, the impact of contractual conditions on project performance is mediated by the non-
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contractual features of a project. This proves that obligations established under a contract are 
not sufficient to optimise project performance. 
The measurement items provided in Appendix A constitute a valid and reliable 
instrument for measuring governance and project impact, making them appropriate for use in 
the scientific community for future empirical research. This new instrument will enable fine-
grained research, particularly for testing the performance implications of various 
combinations of mechanism items within different project contexts. The study also has many 
practical implications. Client organisations need to shift away from a conventional approach 
to governance design, which primarily focuses on market mechanisms and specific actions, 
such as inviting single or multiple team/s to participate in the pricing stage. There is a need to 
increase emphasis on informal mechanisms, since these are a stronger predictor of 
performance outcomes. Required actions include making decisions on a ‘best-for-project’ 
basis, seeking consensus across the supply chain in decision making, and effectively 
engaging community stakeholders. In addition, a relationship manager with sufficient 
authority and resources to build and maintain cooperation over the life of the project 
improves project outcomes. Appendix A shows the specific actions necessary to develop 
comprehensive workshops, communication systems, and full supply-chain involvement in 
design. These actions enable fairer risk and reward sharing and a greater degree of collective 
cost estimation, even when more conventional procurement approaches are used, such as DB.  
The results also indicate that construction businesses providing services on projects 
should emphasize their competence in implementing collaborative governance, which is often 
overshadowed by firms’ overwhelming emphasis on their technological and contract 
management capabilities. The governance measurement instrument shown at Appendix A 
enables firms to evaluate their collaborative abilities, thereby facilitating better positioning 
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strategies. Improved awareness of their collaborative competence will assist firms in lobbying 
their clients for more informal mechanisms on construction projects.  
The statistical generalizability of this research gives it an authority missing from 
earlier studies based on inductive methods. While the findings are valid and reliable in the 
Australian setting, replicability studies are required internationally to determine if the 
relationships observed here hold elsewhere. That being said, if projects were being governed 
similarly, for a similar range of infrastructure in another developed economy, it is hard to 
imagine that the results reported here would not hold. Further research is warranted to test 
this proposition. A limitation of the current research is that it examined only collaborative 
procurement methods; further research that compared the performance of collaborative with 
traditional methods would also be useful, particularly if the delayed litigation costs associated 
with the latter could be taken into account when calculating costs.  
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Fig. 1 The conceptual model 
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Fig. 2 First order CFA model of contractual governance structures (Model s2) 
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Fig. 3 Fitted path model with ‘project scope’ (Model s6) 
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Fig. 4 Fitted path model without ‘project scope’ (Model s7) 
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Tables 
Table 1 Project and respondent characteristics (N=320a) 
 n %   n % 
Project characteristics       
Type of client    Project completion time    
Public sector 276 86.3  2008 and before 12 4.3 
Private sector  44 13.8  2009 16 5.8 
    2010 44 16 
 Experience of client in asset procurement    2011 35 12.7 
Experienced  285 89.6  2012 113 41.1 
Inexperienced  33 10.4  2013 29 10.5 
    2014 and after 26 9.4 
       
Type of contract    Project Sector    
Project alliance 155 51.8  Road 113 38.0 
Program alliance 80 26.8  Water 89 30.0 
Early contractor involvement 27 9.0  Rail 52 17.5 
Design and construct with collaboration 16 5.4  Energy 14 4.7 
Cost plus incentive fee with collaboration 8 2.7  Building 10 3.4 
Early tender involvement 8 2.7  Mining 10 3.4 
Lump sum with collaboration 4 1.3  Oil & gas 4 1.3 
Other contracts with collaboration 1 0.3  Waste management 3 1.0 
    Defence 2 0.7 
       
Project Value (m = million)    Project Location    
< $5m 7 2.3  NSW 98 30.7 
$5m to < $10m 3 1.0  Qld 85 26.6 
$10m to < $50m 18 5.9  WA 71 22.3 
$50m to < $100m 41 13.5  Vic 43 13.5 
$100m to < $500m 142 46.9  NZ 9 2.8 
> $500m 92 30.4  SA 8 2.5 
    ACT 2 0.6 
    NT 2 0.6 
    Tas 1 0.3 
Respondents characteristics       
 
Number of collaborative projects the respondent 
had previously worked on prior to this project:  
   
Type of organisation you 
worked for on the 
collaborative project: 
  
0 35 10.9  Client 108 34.3 
1 38 11.9  Contractor 106 33.7 
2 60 18.8  Consultant 98 31.1 
3 42 13.1  Supplier 2 0.6 
4 28 8.8  Subcontractor 1 0.3 
5 29 9.1     
6 22 6.9     
7 5 1.6     
8 5 1.6     
9 1 0.3     
> 10 55 17.2     
a  Totals for each variable may not sum to 320 due to non-responses to specific survey items. 
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Table 2 Fit indices of the CFA and path models 
 Value representative of 
a well-fitting model* 
Model s1a Model s2b 
& 
Model s3c 
Model s4d 
& 
Model s5e 
Model s6f Model s7g 
Sample adequacy        
Ratio of parameter estimate to sample size  1:10 1:19 1:19 1:17 1:40 1:64 
Hoelter’s critical N (CN) at 0.05 level > 200 280 491 232 308 478 
Model fit indices       
Chi-square (χ2)  34.455 23.549 37.968 6.212 2.566 
Normed Chi-square: χ2/ df (df: degree of 
freedom) 
1.0-3.0 1.813 1.239 2.233 3.106 2.566 
p (probability level)  > 0.05 .016 .214 .002 .045 .109 
Bollen-Stine bootstrap p (computed across 
1,000 bootstrap samples) 
> 0.05 .061 .339 .056 .054 .117 
GFI (goodness-of-fit index) >0.90 .974 .982 .972 .990 .995 
AGFI (adjusted goodness-of-fit index) >0.90 .950 .966 .940 .952 .968 
NFI (normed fit index) >0.90 .926 .950 .968 .949 .976 
CFI (comparative fit index)  close to 0.95 .965 .990 .982 .964 .985 
RMSEA (root mean square error of 
approximation) 
(<0.05: good fit; 0.080 
– 0.10 : mediocre fit; > 
0.10:  poor fit) 
.050 .027 .062 .081 .070 
Notes: * Source of references:  Byrne (2010), Hair et al. (1998), and Kline (2005). 
a Model s1: the initial first-order CFA model of the PG construct.  
b Model s2: the final first-order CFA model of the PG construct. 
c Model s3: the second-order CFA model of the PG construct. 
d Model s4: the first-order CFA model of the PP construct. 
e Model s5: the second-order CFA model of the PP construct. 
 f Model s6: the initial path model including ‘project value’ testing mediating effect of the IM construct. 
g Model s7: the final path model excluding ‘project value’ testing mediating effect of the IM construct. 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics and correlations  
 
Mean Std MIN MAX 1 2 3 4 
1. Project value  4.98 1.10 1 7 
    
2. Formal mechanisms (FM) 4.93 1.20 1.00 7.00 .135* 
   
3. Informal mechanisms (IM) 5.41 0.91 2.05 7.00 .170** .425** 
  
4. Project governance (PG) 5.24 0.86 2.33 6.90 .182** .794** .888** 
 
5. Project performance (PP) 5.14 1.03 1.25 7.00 -.035 .224** .349** .348** 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 4 Regression analysis results (standardized coefficients  (β) ) 1 
 Effect of PG on PP Effect of FM on IM  
Dependent variable PP IM  
 Model r1 Model r2 Model r3 Model r4 Model r5 
Hypothesis H1 H3 H5 H1 & H3 H6 
Control Variables      
Project value   -.069  -.096  -.103  -.104  .113* 
Independent variables      
Formal mechanisms (FM) .247**   .118*  .416** 
Informal mechanisms (IM)  .359**  .309**  
Project governance (PG)   .369**   
R2 .061 .126 .133 .140 .199 
Adjusted R2 .055 .121 .127 .129 .194 
F change 10.041** 22.276** 23.589** 16.347** 38.231** 
** Significance at p < 0.01 level 2 
* Significance at p < 0.05 level 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
  7 
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Appendix A  8 
Factorial structure of Project Governance and Project Performance 9 
 EFA 
factor 
loadings 
Second-order CFA 
factor loading  
(standardized 
estimates, significant 
at p< 0.01) 
Factorial structure of  Project Governance (PG)    
Factor 1 Formal  Mechanisms (FM)  0.91 
Factor 1-1 Risk and reward sharing regime  0.91 
⋅ Any profit due to cost under-runs that was allocated to the key 
service providers was shared fairly between the key service 
providers. 
0.81  
⋅ Any share of loss due to cost over-runs that was allocated to the 
key service providers was shared fairly between the key service 
providers. 
0.81  
⋅ The client and key service providers shared equal proportions of 
profit due to cost under-runs. 
0.78  
⋅ The client and key service providers shared equal proportions of 
loss due to project overruns. 
0.78  
⋅ Each key service provider's overall downside risk was capped at 
the loss of its fee. 
0.72  
⋅ A single agreement was developed to acknowledge that the 
parties would collectively share project risk. 
0.70  
⋅ There were incentive mechanisms to meet project goals. 0.55  
   
Factor 1-2 Collective cost estimation  0.26 
⋅ The client selected only one service provider to participate in the 
pricing stage. 
0.83  
⋅ The client and the key service providers collectively estimated 
the expected project cost. 
0.76  
   
Factor 1-3 Risk sharing of service providers   0.66 
⋅ The key service providers paid a penalty if completion dates were 
not met. 
0.78  
⋅ The key service providers solely carried the risk of rising costs. 0.77  
  
Factor 2 Informal  Mechanisms (IM)  0.49 
Factor 2-1 Leadership  0.66 
⋅ The project leaders had strong communication skills. 0.86  
⋅ The project leaders had strong logistical skills. 0.83  
⋅ The project leaders made decisions on a ‘best-for-project’ basis. 0.80  
⋅ The project leaders encouraged cooperation between parties. 0.72  
⋅ The project leaders sought consensus across the supply chain in 
decision making. 
0.72  
⋅ The project leaders effectively engaged with community 
stakeholders. 
0.64  
   
Factor 2-2 Team Workshops  0.77 
⋅ Where appropriate, workshops involved all levels of seniority. 0.86  
⋅ Where appropriate, workshops involved a broad range of 0.85  
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 EFA 
factor 
loadings 
Second-order CFA 
factor loading  
(standardized 
estimates, significant 
at p< 0.01) 
participant types. 
⋅ Workshops were used for post-review assessment. 0.71  
⋅ Workshops were used for innovation development. 0.67  
⋅ Workshops were used for integration of key service providers. 0.65  
⋅ Workshops were run by an independent facilitator. 0.62  
   
Factor 2-3 Relationship Manager  0.51 
⋅ There was a relationship manager to maintain cooperation over 
the life of the project. 
0.88  
⋅ There was a relationship manager to build cooperation in the 
early stages of the project. 
0.87  
 
 
  
Factor 2-4 Communication System   0.49 
⋅ An integrated web-based IT system was established, including 
Building Information Modelling (BIM). 
0.80  
⋅ Communication tools (such as an expectation matrix) were 
developed to allow participant organisations to align their 
commitments to each other. 
 
0.71  
 
Factor 2-5 Design Integration 
  
0.32 
⋅ Construction subcontractors were involved in design. 0.84  
⋅ Suppliers were involved in design. 0.78  
⋅ The main contractor was involved in design. 0.70  
   
Total variance explained (rotation sums of squared loadings) 68.5%  
Cronbach’s Alpha (α)  0.87  
   
Factorial structure of Project Performance (PP)   
Factor 1 Sustainable operation  0.82 
⋅ Environment impact 0.86 0.89 
⋅ Community impact 0.80 0.83 
⋅ Safety 0.79 0.73 
   
Factor 2 Innovation and collaboration  0.93 
⋅ Innovation 0.81 0.75 
⋅ Team collaboration 0.80 0.74 
⋅ Quality of work 0.72 0.78 
   
Factor 3 Cost and time efficiency  0.58 
⋅ Cost efficiency 0.89 0.74 
⋅ Time efficiency 0.86 0.85 
   
Total variance explained (rotation sums of squared loadings) 76.9%  
Cronbach’s Alpha (α)  0.86  
 10 
 11 
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